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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-SINCE THE
MEADOWLANDS SPORTS COMPLEX IS NOT A PUBLIC FORUM,
THE PROHIBITION OF ALL LITERATURE
DISTRIBUTION AND FUND SOLICITATION
BY OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS
DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Authority (1982)
The Meadowlands Sports Complex is an athletic complex constructed
and operated by the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority (Authority)
in the Hackensack, New Jersey Meadowlands.I The complex includes a race
track, a stadium, and a large parking lot servicing both the stadium and the
track.2 The Authority has adopted a policy prohibiting all outside organiza-
tions, except licensed concessionaires, from distributing literature or solicit-
ing donations at the complex.
3
1. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports
& Exposition Auth., 532 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.J. 1981), aj'd, 691 F.2d 155, 158, reh'g
denied, 691 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1982). The New Jersey state legislature created the
Authority in 1971 to construct and operate the Meadowlands Sports Complex. See
generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:10-1 (1972 & West Supp. 1982-83). The Authority is
characterized as an instrumentality of the New Jersey state government "exercising
public and essential governmental functions. . . and the application of the revenue
derived from the project . . . shall be deemed and held to be applied in support of
government." d. § 5:10-4a.
2. 691 F.2d at 158-59. Although a new arena had been constructed while the
case was pending in the district court and additional facilities were planned for the
complex, the Third Circuit limited its decision to the race track, stadium, and park-
ing areas. Id. at 159 n.1. The race track is operated directly by the Authority pursu-
ant to statutory authority. Id. at 158. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:10-6. The race track
"is located near the stadium, and the two structures share a parking lot." 691 F.2d at
158. The chief source of income and the financial key to the Authority's operation is
the revenue obtained from the parimutuel betting at the race track. Id. The revenue
from wagering enables the Authority to meet its operation and maintenance expenses
and to pay its debts. Id. For additional information on the operation of the Author-
ity, see New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 10, 292 A.2d
545, 549 (1972).
The New York Football Giants, Inc. is the stadium's primary tenant and, pursu-
ant to its 30-year lease, is entitled to exclusive possession of the stadium and parking
area on designated dates. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 532 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (D.N.J. 1981). The
Cosmos Soccer Club, Inc. has a similar 10-year lease. Id. Under both leases the
Authority and these teams share the revenue obtained from the stadium parking and
admission fees and concession sales. 691 F.2d at 158. When neither team is utilizing
the stadium, the Authority leases it for high school and college football games, reli-
gious conventions, and commencement exercises. Id.
3. 691 F.2d at 158-59. For the court's characterization of the uniformity of this
(741)
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In 1978, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISK-
CON)4 brought an action against the Authority for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' alleging that the Authority's refusal to
permit ISKCON to distribute literature in exchange for solicited donations
6
at the complex violated ISKCON members' first amendment rights. 7 The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found that while
ISKCON's missionary activities were protected by the free exercise clause of
the first amendment, 8 the race track, stadium, and parking lot did not con-
stitute a public forum. 9 Therefore, the district court applied the rational
basis test to determine the constitutional validity of the Authority's policy."°
policy and the nature of the concession stands, see note 76 and accompanying text
4. 691 F.2d at 158. The Third Circuit characterized ISKCON as a "religious
body." Id. The District Court for the District of New Jersey designated ISKCON a
secular auxiliary of the Hare Krishna Movement. 532 F. Supp. at 1096. For further
information on the history and current practices and dogma of ISKCON, see gener-
ally id. at 1096-98; J. STILLSON, JUDAH, HARE KRISHNA & THE COUNTERCULTURE
(1974); KRISHNA; MYTHS, RITES AND ATTITUDES (M. Singer ed. 1966).
5. 691 F.2d at 158. ISKCON sought declaratory relief under § 1983, which pro-
vides that any person who, under color of law deprives any citizen of the United
States of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the
laws, shall be liable to the injured party in an action at law, or suit in equity. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
Two privately owned, profit-making corporations, the New York Football Gi-
ants, Inc. and the Cosmos Soccer Club, Inc. also were joined as defendants. 691 F.2d
at 158. The district court dismissed ISKCON's claims against these defendants on
the grounds that neither corporation maintained a no solicitation policy, and if they
had, they would have the same right as any other private enterprise to regulate the
activities of their patrons. 532 F. Supp. at. 1102-03, 1106.
6. 691 F.2d at 158. The Third Circuit noted that "ISKCON does not wish to
distribute literature without simultaneously soliciting money." Id. at 161 n.3.
Hence, the two activities were not considered separately.
7. Id. at 158. The district court addressed an alleged violation of the first
amendment free exercise clause. 532 F. Supp. at 1097-98. On appeal, the Third
Circuit limited its decision to the possible violations of the first amendment free
speech clause. 691 F.2d at 159-60.
For the text of the first amendment, see note 13 infra.
8. 532 F. Supp. at 1097-98. The district court held that in order to be protected
by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, "it is not necessary that the form of
exercise itself be a ritual or ceremony typical of or required by the particular religion
... [I]t is clear from the cases that [fund raising], carried on to advance and sup-
port the religious purpose, is sufficient in and of itself." Id. at 1097. The district
court then concluded that
the ambulatory colportuering which plaintiffs wish to carry on within the
Sports Complex comes within the protection of the free exercise clause,
without regard to whether the activity is in fact one required by the
Krishna religion and without regard to whether it is or is not part of the
ceremony of sankirtan.
Id. at 1098.
9. 532 F. Supp. at 1100-01. The district court stated that "[t]he record of this
case is clear that neither the race track nor the stadium is designed, built, intended or
used as a public forum. The same is true of the blacktop automobile parking areas
bordering them." Id. at 1100.
10. Id. at 1103. In particular, the district court stated that the test to be used for
[Vol. 28: p. 741
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The district court concluded that the Authority's total ban on all literature
distribution and fund solicitation did not violate the first amendment rights
of ISKCON's members."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 12
affirmed without dissent, holding that the Meadowlands Sports Complex race
track, stadium, and parking area did not constitute a public forum, and that
the Authority's absolute prohibition of literature distribution and fund solic-
itation therefore did not infringe ISKCON members' first amendment right
of free speech. International Society for Krishna Consctousness, Inc. v. New Jersey
Sports &Exposition Authority, 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
"Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the freedom of speech."'' 3 Al-
though freedom of speech is granted special protection, 14 individuals none-
theless do not have a constitutional right to speak on any subject whenever
locations that are not public forums is whether the Authority's policy has a rational
basis and is not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Id.
11. Id. at 1103-05. The district court listed seven reasons that supported its find-
ing of a rational basis for the Authority's policy: 1) The complex did not rationally
resemble other locations traditionally characterized as public forums; 2) The solicita-
tion of money from patrons would remove available funds for betting; 3) The inter-
ception of patrons would adversely affect revenue because it might delay their arrival
at the betting windows until after the bets are closed; 4) Revenues would be reduced
by patrons who preferred to attend other tracks to avoid solicitation; 5) The presence
of large amounts of cash created unique considerations of safety and prevention of
fraud; 6) The patrons would be a captive audience for solicitation and therefore
would find it difficult to avoid the solicitation efforts even if they so desired; and 7) If
the Authority were required to permit solicitation by ISKCON, it would have to
allow all other organizations to solicit funds also which would overburden the al-
ready limited facilities of the complex. Id.
12. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Aldisert and Weis, and Judge Edward
D. Re, Chief Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation. Judge Weis delivered the opinion of the court.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in full: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." Id. The first amendment applies to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting and foreshadowing stricter scrutiny of legislation which impacts upon
freedom of speech). Justice Cardozo characterized freedom of speech and thought as
follows: "Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensible condi-
tion, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937). Justice Brandeis explained why freedom to express even unpopular ideas was
essential to democratic government:
Those who won our independence . ..believed that freedom to think as
you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth . . . . [T]hey knew that order cannot be se-
cured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govern-
ment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
1982-83]
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and wherever they choose.' 5 For example, in Adderley v. Florida,' 6 the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of college students for blocking and
demonstrating on the nonpublic driveway of a county jail. 17 The Adderley
Court maintained that a state, like a private property owner, could control
the use of its property, and that the first amendment does not guarantee
access to property for speech purposes merely because the property is owned
or controlled by the government.' 8  Similarly, in Greer v. Spock,' 9 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of military regulations which
prohibited partisan political speeches, demonstrations, and leaflet distribu-
tion on a military base, reasoning that the fact that the public is freely ad-
mitted to certain government property does not guarantee access to that
property for first amendment purposes.
20
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("we reject the view that
freedom of speech and association. . . are 'absolutes' "). See also Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 836 (1976) ("The guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant
'that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right
to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.' ") (quoting Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("The
rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still
do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at
any public place and at any time.").
16. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
17. Id. at 48. The students were convicted for violating a Florida trespass stat-
ute. Id. at 40. The statute made criminal "[e]very trespass upon the property of
another, committed with a malicious and mischievous intent." Id. at 40 n.1.
18. Id. at 47-48. The Court, in Adderley, stated that "[t]he State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47. The Adderley Court also noted
that enforcement of the trespass statute had been even-handed and that there was no
evidence that the students were arrested because of the content of their demonstra-
tion. Id. TheAdderley Court rejected the argument that citizens have a constitutional
right to protest "whenever and however and wherever they please." Id. at 48 (citing
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55, 563-64 (1965)). See also United States Postal
Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) ("the First Amendment
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government"). For further discussion of the Greenburgh case, see notes 28-30 and ac-
companying text infra.
19. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The commanding officer of Fort Dix, a federal military
base located in New Jersey, rejected the request of Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates to distribute campaign literature and to hold a political meeting at the
base. Id. at 832-33. In rejecting the candidates' request, the Fort Dix commander
relied on military regulations which banned speeches and demonstiations of a parti-
san political nature and also prohibited distribution of literature in the absence of
prior approval. Id. at 831. The candidates brought a suit to enjoin the enforcement
of these regulations on the ground that they violated the first and fifth amendments
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 833-34.
20. Id. at 831, 836. The Court held that a place does not become a public forum
merely because it is owned or operated by the government and members of the pub-
lic are freely permitted to visit. d. at 830, 836. In reaching its decision, the Court
distinguished Flower v. United States. Id. at 834-38 (discussing Flower v. United States,
[Vol. 28: p. 741
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The degree of permissible government regulation of speech or speech-
related conduct which occurs on government property turns on whether the
government property involved is characterized as a public forum. 2 1 In Cox v.
New Hampshire,2 2 the Supreme Court held that if an area is found to be a
public forum, the state may restrict the exercise of first amendment rights
only through regulations which are reasonable in time, place, and manner.
2 3
407 U.S. 197 (1972)). In Flower, the Supreme Court held that since a street, within
the jurisdiction of a military fort, had been treated by the military as a public thor-
oughfare of the city, the military therefore "abandoned any claim [of] . ..special
interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue." 407 U.S. at 198.
The Court in Greer noted that in contrast to the fact situation in Flower, there had
been no abandonment of a special interest claim in Greer. 424 U.S. at 837. For fur-
ther discussion of Greer, see note 64 and accompanying text in a.
21. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). For a discussion and
analysis of the Cox decision, see notes 22-23 and accompanying text infra.
For a general discussion and historical background of the public forum doctrine,
see Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979);
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Loutisana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233.
22. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). In Cox, The Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring
a permit in advance of any parade or procession on the public streets. Id. at 570-71.
23. Id. at 576-78. The Court in Cox held that although the streets are tradi-
tional public forums, the valid governmental interest in public safety and traffic con-
trol justifies reasonable regulation of parades. Id. at 576. The Court found that since
there was no evidence that the licensing requirement had been administered in a
discriminatory manner, the statute was upheld as a reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulation. Id. at 577.
For other cases recognizing the applicability of reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions on the exercise of free speech on public forums, see generally Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair
rule requiring all groups desiring to sell, exhibit, or distribute written material at fair
grounds to do so from a fixed location upheld as a reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restriction); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980) (New York Public Service Commission order barring utility companies from
including bill inserts that express opinions on controversial public policy issues can-
not be upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction); Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (township ordinance prohibiting posting of
real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs does not transform the issue into a time,
place, or manner case because the proscription applies to only one mode of communi-
cation); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Virginia statute delaring it unprofessional conduct for licensed
pharmacist to advertise prices of prescription drugs exceeds proper bounds of time,
place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972) (town's anti-noise ordinance prohibiting a person, while on the
grounds adjacent to a building in which a school is in session, from willfully making
noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the
school session is a valid time, place, or manner regulation).
While reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech in a public
forum is permissible, the government may not absolutely deny access to a forum to
any individual or group if the area is characterized as a public forum. See Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 574 ("the question in a particular case is whether that
control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly
and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public
questions immemorially associated with resort to public places"); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) ("The privilege.., to use the streets and parks for commu-
1982-831
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations must be content-neutral, 24 must serve significant govern-
mental interests, 25 and must leave open adequate alternative channels for
communication.
26
If an area is not a public forum, the government may restrict and even
prohibit all forms of expression if the restrictions are reasonable and content-
neutral. 27 For example, in United States Postal Servz'e v. Greenburgh Ci'vi'c As-
sociations,28 the Supreme Court determined that letterboxes were not public
forums. 29 Hence, the "time, place, and manner" analysis appropriate for
nication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; ...
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.").
24. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
536-37 (1980) (prohibition of propaganda on politically controversial issues is not
content-neutral and hence is a constitutionally impermissible time, place, and man-
ner regulation); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 442 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (city ordi-
nance making it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for drive-in movie
theater to show films containing nudity is unconstitutional discrimination on the ba-
sis of content); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (ordinance
that describes impermissible picketing in terms of subject matter "slip[s] from the
neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content." (quoting
Kalven, supra note 21, at 29)). For similar views regarding content-neutrality, see
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976);
Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973).
25. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (significant gov-
ernment interest in protecting efficient functioning of educational process justifies
prohibition of noisy behavior where it would create a material disruption to aca-
demic classes).
26. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981) (total ban
of live dancing could not be upheld as a valid time, place, and manner regulation
because it did not leave open adequate alternative channels for this form of protected
expression). For other cases requiring adequate alternative channels of expression,
see generally United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980);
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
27. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see notes 28-30 and accompany-
ing text infra.
28. 453 U.S. 114 (1981). The Greenburgh case arose when a nonprofit civic asso-
ciation which placed unstamped notices and pamphlets in the letterboxes of private
homes was warned that knowingly distributing unstamped mailable matter in a let-
terbox used by the United States Postal Service for the receipt of mail, violated a
federal statute. Id. at 116. The civic association and other members of a council of
civic associations sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
this statute. Id. The appellees argued that the statute denied their rights of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press secured by the first amendment. Id. at 116-17.
29. Id. at 128, 132. The Court explained that
a letterbox, once designated as an 'authorized depository,' does not at the
same time undergo a transformation into a 'public forum' of some limited
nature to which the First Amendment guarantees access to all comers.
There is neither historical nor constitutional support for the characteriza-
6
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public forums was unnecessary; the court upheld a federal law restricting
access to letterboxes under the nonpublic forum test of reasonableness and
content-neutrality. 30
In determining whether an area owned or controlled by the government
is a public forum, the Supreme Court considers three factors: 1) the charac-
ter and function of the forum, 3 1 2) whether the particular speech or speech-
related conduct is compatible with the normal activities and functions of the
particular forum at a particular time,32 and 3) whether the speech or speech-
tion of a letterbox as a public forum. . . .[It is a giant leap from the tradi-
tional 'soap box' to the letter box designated as an authorized depository of
the United States mails, and we do not believe the First Amendment re-
quires us to make that leap.
Id. at 128-31 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the factors involved in the char-
acterization of government property as a public forum or a nonpublic forum, see
notes 31-33 and accompanying text ihfra.
30. Id. at 131 n.4. The Court stated that the time, place, and manner analysis
was inappropriate because a letterbox was not a public forum. Id. The Court com-
mented that
[P]roperty owned or controlled by the government which is not a public
forum may be subject to a prohibition of speech, leafleting, picketing, or
other forms of communication without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment. Admittedly, the government must act reasonably in imposing such
restrictions, and the prohibition must be content-neutral. But for the rea-
sons stated in our opinion, we think it cannot be questioned that [the fed-
eral regulation] is both a reasonable and content-neutral regulation.
Id. at 131 n.7. The Court apparently accepted the justifications for the statute of-
fered by the Postal Service, which included the protection of mail revenues and the
continued efficiency of mail delivery. See id. at 129. For a statement of the standard
for reviewing restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights on nonpublic fo-
rums, see text accompanying note 27 supra.
31. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). In Grayned, the
Court stated that "[tjhe nature of the place, the pattern of its normal activities, dic-
tate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Id.
(citations omitted). For other cases emphasizing the character and function of the
locale, see generally Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966). For further discussion of Grayned and the character and function factor of the
public forum doctrine, see notes 34-37 and accompanying text lnfra.
32. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). For further anal-
ysis of Grayned, see notes 34-37 and accompanying text infra. For other Supreme
Court cases that have adopted the compatibility factor to determine whether a pub-
lic forum exists, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 132 (1977) (prison regulation prohibiting solicitation of inmates to join a prison-
ers' labor union upheld on the basis that this first amendment activity was incompat-
ible with "reasonable considerations of penal management"); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. at 838 (military base regulation prohibiting political speechmaking and litera-
ture distribution upheld by relying on the unique function of military installations
"to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum"). For further discussion of Greer, see
notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (ban on political advertising in buses upheld; plurality con-
cluded that advertising space in the city transit system was not a public forum be-
cause political speech was incompatible with preserving the city's commercial
interests); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. at 41 (jailhouse property was not a public
forum because jails are "built for security purposes" and distinguishable from "state
1982-83]
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related conduct is consistent with specific governmental interests in regulat-
ing speech at the particular location.3 3 For example, in Grayned v. City of
Rockford,34 the Court, in upholding an antinoise ordinance, characterized
school grounds as a limited public forum. 35 The Court stated that the mu-
nicipality could not prohibit all expressive activity at or near school property
by students and members of the public because the character and function
of schools often make them the focus of significant grievances. 36 However,
the government interest in protecting class sessions against disruption justi-
fied limiting the availability of school grounds as a public forum to the times
when such use would not be incompatible with the functioning of the
school. 3
7
The third consideration in determining whether a specific area is a pub-
lic forum was further explained in He, on v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. ,38 where the Supreme Court upheld regulations restricting
ISKCON's distribution, sales, and solicitation activities at a state fair to a
fixed location. 39 The Court in Heffon analyzed ISKCON's activities and
capitol grounds" as not open to the public). For further discussion of Adderley, see
notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
33. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 649 (1981). For further discussion of Heff on and the governmental interest
prong of the public forum doctrine, see notes 38-40 and accompanying text bhfra.
34. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Defendant Grayned was convicted for participating in
a public demonstration protesting discriminatory treatment of Black students at a
Rockford, Illinois high school. Id. at 105. Grayned and approximately 200 other
demonstrators marched on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building. Id.
The evidence presented at trial was sharply contradictory. Government witnesses
stated that the demonstrators cheered, chanted, and made other noises audible in the
school while defense witnesses asserted that the demonstrators were quiet and or-
derly. Id.
35. Id. at 116-20. The ordinance prohibited persons in areas near classroom
buildings during the time classes were in session from "willfully mak[ing] or as-
sist[ing] in the making of any noise of diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of such school session." Id. at 108. The Court interpreted the
ordinance to prohibit "only actual or imminent interference with the 'peace or good
order' of the school." Id. at 111-12.
36. Id. at 117.
37. Id. at 116-20. Expressive activity can be prohibited around a school if it
"materially disrupts classwork or includes substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others." Id. at 120 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
38. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). ISKCON, an international religious organization es-
pousing the views of the Krishna religion, filed suit in Minnesota state court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against Minnesota officials in reference to a rule of
the Minnesota Agricultural Society-a public corporation operating Minnesota's
state fair-which required any person, group, or firm desiring to sell within the state
fairgrounds to do so from a fixed location. Id. at 644-45.
39. Id. at 647-55. In Hefon, the Supreme Court designated the Minnesota State
Fair as a "limited" public forum "in that it exists to provide a means for a great
number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commer-
cial, religious, or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion." Id. at
655. The Court ruled that the regulation requiring members of ISKCON who desire
to practice Sankirtan at the state fair to confine their distribution, sales, and solicita-
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found that they were inconsistent with the state's significant interests in or-
derly movement and crowd control at the state fair.4°
The three considerations employed in determining public forum status
have been applied in a variety of contexts. 41 The Supreme Court has em-
phasized the character and function of streets, 42 parks,4 3 and sidewalks44 in
tion activities to assigned booths within the fairgrounds is a permissible restriction on
the time, place, and manner of communicating the views of the Krishna religion and
as such does not unconstitutionally abridge protected first amendment rights. Id. at
647-55.
40. Id. at 649-54. The Court's rationale in Heffon proceeded as follows: First,
the regulation was not based on the content or subject matter of the speech. Id. at
648-49. Second, since the method of allocating space was on a first-come, first-serve
basis, it was nondiscriminatory and not open to arbitrary application. Id. at 649.
Third, the State's interest in maintaining the orderly movement and control of the
crowds at the fair, given the large number of exhibitors and visitors attending the
fair, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a time, place, or manner restriction
must serve a significant governmental interest. Id. at 649-53. Fourth, alternative
forums for the expression of ISKCON's protected speech exist since the regulation
did not prevent ISKCON from practicing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fair-
grounds, nor did it exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds. Id. at 654-55. The Court
noted that ISKCON's members may mingle with the crowds and orally propagate
their views and obtain a booth on the fairgrounds to distribute and sell literature and
solicit funds from that location. Id. at 655.
41. For a general discussion of the contexts in which the public forum doctrine
has been analyzed, see notes 42-46 and accompanying text i7fta.
42. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, a suit was brought to
enjoin municipal officers from enforcing ordinances forbidding the distribution of
printed matter and the holding, without permits, of public meetings on streets and at
other public places. Id. at 500-01. The Supreme Court held that the ordinances were
an unconstitutional deprivation of the first amendment rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly. Id at 514-18. A year earlier the Court had struck down a simi-
lar ordinance restricting the first amendment right of freedom of press. See Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The ordinance at issue in Lovell required prior
licensing for the distribution of any literature within the city limits, whether on pub-
lic or private property. Id. at 447-48. The Court held that the ordinance was an
unconstitutional infringement of freedom of press, declaring that "it strikes at the
very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censor-
ship," without reaching the public forum issue. Id. at 451-53.
See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1940). The Court in Cox noted
that "the question in a particular case is whether [a] control is exerted so as not to
deny or unwarrantly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the com-
munication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associ-
ated with resort to public places." Id. at 574 (citations omitted). For a further
discussion of the facts and rationale of the Cox case, see notes 22-23 and accompany-
ing text supra. Cf Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1950) (invalidating
ordinance conditioning expression of religious views on public streets upon procure-
ment of a permit which "vest[ed] in an administrative official discretion to grant or
withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public
places"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (finding an ordinance which
absolutely prohibited the distribution of any handbill upon any public street or side-
walk an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech, noting that "one who is
rightfully on a street . . . carries with him . . . the constitutional right to express his
views in an orderly fashion"); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (inval-
idating city ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on public streets in order
to prevent littering because the regulation constituted a total ban on first amendment
1982-83]
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declaring them to be the clearest examples of public forums. The Court has
stated that streets, parks, and sidewalks "have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions."'4 5 For this reason, the Court has consistently held
that access to these places for the purpose of exercising first amendment
rights46 can only be regulated by reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
rights in a public forum rather than a mere restriction on time, place, or manner of
distribution).
43. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1970). The Court in Nemo/ko
held that the lack of standards in the practice of issuing permits to religious groups in
order that they may use the city parks violated the fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection and first amendment freedom of speech and religion. Id. at 271-73.
44. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). In Cox, a group of
approximately 2000 black students led by Cox, staged a peaceful civil rights demon-
stration on the sidewalk across from the local courthouse. Id. at 539-42. Cox was
arrested and convicted of violating a Louisiana statute prohibiting the obstruction of
a public passageway. Id. at 553. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction as
violating the petitioners' first amendment freedom of speech and assembly rights. Id.
at 558. The Court recognized the tenuous balance between "the right of a State or
municipality to regulate the use of city streets and other facilities to assure the safety
and convenience of the people in their use and the concomitant right of the people of
free speech and assembly." Id. (citations omitted).
45. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion). For further
discussion of Hague, see note 42 and accompanying text supra and note 47 and accom-
panying text ihfra.
46. The first amendment right of freedom of speech can be manifested in a
number of ways other than through "pure speech":
1) Literature distribution is an exercise of the right of freedom of speech. See
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 148, 160 (1939) (individual liberties to speak, write,
paint, or circulate information or opinion must remain paramount to government
regulation of such forms of communication even in the interest of health, safety, or
other public needs). For other cases extending constitutionally protected speech to
the communication of ideas by handbills and literature distribution, see Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
2) Distribution of literature in exchange for solicited donations is also pro-
tected under the first amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111
(1943) ("the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers
rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a commerical enter-
prise. . . . Freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of religion are available to
all, not merely to those who can pay their own way"). For other cases holding that
first amendment protections are not lost because the written materials sought to be
distributed are sold rather than given away, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981). For further analysis of the Heffron case, see notes 38-40 and accompanying
text supra.
3) Loud noise may be protected by the first amendment. See Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 107-21 (antinoise ordinance prohibiting a person while on
grounds adjacent to a building in which school is in session from making a noise or
diversion that disturbs the peace and good order of the school session is not unconsti-
tutionally vague or overbroad). For further analysis of Graned, see notes 34-47 and
accompanying text supra. See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (plurality
upheld city ordinance prohibiting sound trucks and similar devices from emitting
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tions.4 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the character and
nature of the locale in granting public forum status to government-owned or
government-controlled facilities which are deliberately created and used for
the primary purpose of providing a forum for public communication, 48 in-
loud and raucous noises; ordinance was narrowly drawn as applying only to vehicles
containing a sound amplifier when operated in the public streets); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (invalidating city ordinance which forbade the use of sound
amplification devices as an unconstitutional abridgement of first amendment rights
since it conditioned the use of such equipment on the uncontrolled discretion of tile
Chief of Police).
4) Parades and demonstrations are other ways in which the first amendment
right of free speech can be exercised. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)
(while noting that a balance must be struck between governmental interests and the
people's right of free speech and assembly, the Court "emphatically rejectled] the
notion. . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments offered the same kind of free-
dom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, march-
ing, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who
communicate ideas by pure speech") For further discussion of this case, see note 44
supra. See also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)
(ordinance which conferred upon the city commissioner virtually absolute power to
prohibit any parade, procession, or demonstration on streets or public ways held un-
constitutional); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (ordinance re-
quiring parade permits where official discretion was limited exclusively to
considerations of time, place, and manner so as to conserve the public convenience
upheld).. For a discussion of Cox, see notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
47. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (plurality opinion). Justice Rob-
erts' plurality opinion proceeded as follows:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the
interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in sub-
ordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.
Id. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955
(1983) ("At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks .... In these quintessen-
tial public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.");
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 576 (first amendment rights exercised in a public
forum can be restricted only by reasonable time, place, and manner regulations).
For a discussion of the standards for regulating first amendment rights in a pub-
lic forum, see notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
48. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
The Perry Court noted that "[t]he constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclu-
sions from [public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity] even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place." Id. at 955. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (1978).
Professor Tribe points out "[iun such instances, unlike those of traditional public fo-
rums, status as a forum is triggered not by the simple creation of the facility but by its
deliberate use as a place for the exchange of views among members of the public."
Id. Professor Tribe further comments that
[i]f a governmental meeting were run without invitation to the public, or a
government-owned theater run for the governor's cabinet only, status as a
public forum would not follow. In contrast such places as public streets and
parks must be employed as public forums whether government chooses to
employ them in that way or not.
Id. (emphasis added).
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cluding government meetings open to the public,4 9 municipal theaters and
auditoriums,5 ° state capitol grounds,5 1 and city halls.52 The Court has also
emphasized the character and function of the locale in order to devise "semi-
public forums ' 53 or "limited public forums."'54 The Supreme Court has
49. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). In Madison, the Court invalidated a state em-
ployment commission's order requiring a school board to prohibit teachers who are
not union representatives from speaking at open meetings at which public participa-
tion is permitted, even if the speech is addressed to the subject of pending collective
bargaining negotiations. Id. at 173, 177. The Court concluded that the meeting was
open to the public, and that
the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement. . . . [A]ny
citizen could have presented precisely the same points and provided the
[school] board with the same information as did [the nonunion teacher]
... . The participation in public discussion of public business cannot be
confined to one category of interested individuals. . . . [W]hen the board
sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of
citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the
basis of their employment, or the content of their speech.
Id. at 175-76 (citation omitted). The Court did indicate, however, that "public bod-
ies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic
sessions to transact business." Id. at 175 n.8.
50. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). In
Southeastern, the Court concluded that the producers of the musical "Hair" had been
denied access to the municipal theater on the basis of a judgment that the musical's
content made its presentation contrary to the best interests of the community. Id. at
548. The Court held that since the theater was a public forum for expressive activi-
ties, such a content-based regulation was an invalid time, place, and manner regula-
tion and an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 547-52. Cf Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (although breach of the peace conviction reversed on the
grounds of an invalid jury instruction, the Court assumed by implication that a city
auditorium is a public forum for the exercise of first amendment rights); United
States v. Boesewetter, 463 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1978) (distribution of literature
in exchange for a solicited donation by ISKCON in the halls of Kennedy Center was
compatible with the building's function as a performing arts center, as evidenced by
the permitted commercial sale of souvenir programs and other commemorative items
warranted the classification of Kennedy Center as a semi-public forum and total ban
on religious activities violated ISKCON members' first amendment rights.).
51. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1965). In Edwards, the
Court reversed the breach of the peace convictions of demonstrators who paraded
peaceably through the State House grounds, finding a violation of the demonstrator's
constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to peti-
tion for redress of their grievances. Id. at 235, 238. The Court implied the public
forum status of State House grounds when it stated "[i]f, for example, the petitioners
had been convicted upon evidence that they had violated a law regulating traffic, or
had disobeyed a law reasonably limiting the periods during which the State House
grounds were open to the public, this would be a different case." Id. at 236.
52. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the Court sub
sitentio noted the public forum status of a city hall in reversing the contempt convic-
tion of a union organizer who was served with a temporary restraining order six
hours before his scheduled speech at a city hall. The Court found this an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint of free speech and free assembly. See id. at 532.
53. See L. TRIBE, supra note 48. Professor Tribe notes that "[t]he term has not
previously been employed, but the concept seems implicit in these cases." Id. at 690
n.13.
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granted limited public forum status to public schools, 5 5 the area adjacent to
schools, 56 public libraries, 57 and state fairs. 58 These are areas "created not
54. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. at 655 (explicitly designating a state fair as a limited public forum). For a dis-
cussion of Heffon, see notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
55. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969). In Tinker, the Court held that the public school policy forbidding the wear-
ing of armbands as a protest against the Vietnam War was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the students' free speech rights. Id. at 514. Justice Fortas, speaking for the
majority, stated that "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special character-
tstics of the school environment are available to teachers and students." Id. at 506
(emphasis added). Since the wearing of armbands was "entirely divorced from actu-
ally or potentially disruptive conduct" such that this form of expression was not in-
compatible with the functioning of the school, the school policy was unconstitutional.
Id. at 505-10. Expressive activity could certainly be restricted, but only if the forbid-
den conduct "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or inva-
sion of the rights of others." Id. at 513.
While the Tinker majority did not explicitly characterize the public school as a
"limited public forum" this classification was implicitly endorsed in the following
passage:
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to
be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of
expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an
area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crack-
pots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge
the right to free speech. . . . We properly read it to permit reasonable
regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circum-
stances. But we do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment
rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to super-
vised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
Id.
56. See,e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 118. In Grayned, the Court
exclaimed,
[W]e think it clear that the public sidewalk adjacent to school grounds may
not be declared off limits for expressive activity by members of the public.
But in each case, expressive activity may be prohibited if it 'materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.'
d. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)). For further discussion of the Grayned case, see notes 34-37 and accompanying
text supra.
57. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). The status of a public
library as a limited public forum is difficult to extrapolate from this case. A three
justice plurality reversed the breach of the peace convictions of five Negro demon-
strators as constitutionally invalid because the peaceful sit-in at the public library did
not fall within the scope of the statutory provision. See id. at 139 (plurality opinion).
Nevertheless the plurality opinion can be interpreted as implicitly recognizing that a
silent demonstration in a public library would not be incompatible with the charac-
ter and function of the library and hence would render the library a limited public
forum for the purpose of such expression. See id. at 141-42 (plurality opinion). In
providing an alternative ground for reversing these convictions, Justice Fortas noted
that "[w]e are here dealing with . . . the right under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and freedom to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. at 141 (plurality opinion).
Moreover, these rights "embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful
13
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primarily for public interchange but for purposes closely linked to expres-
sion." 9 The Court has then considered the potential incompatibility of the
speech to the function of the forum and the existence of significant govern-
ment interests in restricting this speech in order to determine whether the
time, place, and manner restrictions on specific types of speech or speech-
related conduct are reasonable. 6°
Finally, for those places owned or controlled by the government whose
character and function are not typically associated with the exercise of first
amendment rights, the Court utilizes the incompatibility test and the gov-
ernment interests test in order to determine whether such places are public
forums. 6 ' The Court has found nonpublic forums when the specific speech
or speech-related conduct sought to be exercised is incompatible with the
function and purpose of the locale 6 2 and there are legitimate government
interests in prohibiting speech or conduct at the place in question. 63 Total
presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional
segregation of public facilities." Id. at 142 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, con-
curring in the result on overbreadth grounds, found it "wholly unnecessary to reach,
let alone rest reversal, . . . on the proposition that even a narrowly drawn 'statute
cannot constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' actions in the circumstances
of this case.' " Id. at 149-50 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White, concurring in
the result on other grounds, suggested that he would not "deem the First Amendment
to forbid a municipal regulation limiting loafing in library reading rooms." Id. at
150 (White, J., concurring). Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Clark, Harlan, and Stewart, angrily declared that the first amendment "does not
guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by
government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas."
Id. at 166 (Black, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. at 647-55. For a discussion of the facts and analysis of the Heffron case, see notes
38-40 and accompanying text supra. For Courts of Appeals cases invalidating similar
"booth regulations," see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bar-
ber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agric. Soc'y,
Inc., 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
59. L. TRIBE, supra note 48, at 690.
60. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 116. The Court, in
proferring a few examples of incompatibility between the expression and the nature
of the forum, stated that
two parades cannot march on the same street simultaneously, and the gov-
ernment may allow only one. . . . A demonstration or parade on a large
street during rush hour might put an intolerable burden on the essential
flow of traffic, and for that reason could be prohibited ....
Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library,
. ..making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That
same speech should be perfectly appropriate in a park.
Id. at 115-16 (citations omitted). For a further discussion of the Grayned case, see
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
61. For a discussion of the nonpublic forum classifications, see notes 32-40 and
accompanying text supra.
62. For a discussion of the incompatibility factor, see notes 32 & 37 and accom-
panying text supra.
63. For a discussion of the government interest requirement, see notes 33-40 and
accompanying text supra.
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bans on specific speech or speech-related conduct have been upheld as con-
stitutional in nonpublic forums including military bases,6 4 jailhouse
grounds,6 5 specific jail cells, 6 6 city transit vehicles, 6 7 private letterboxes, 68
64. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The necessity for excluding
partisan political speech in Greer was based on the traditional purpose of federal mili-
tary reservations, which is "to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum ...
[thereby preserving the government interest] of keeping official military activities
• . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind." Id.
at 838-39. For a further discussion of the Greer case, see notes 19 & 20 and accompa-
nying text supra.
65. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 384 U.S. 39 (1966). The Court in Adderley
denied public forum status to the curtilage of a jailhouse on the ground that jails are
built for security purposes and not for the purpose of creating a forum for the exercise
of speech. Id. at 41. The Court concluded that the first amendment does not pre-
clude the state from controlling the use of its property for its own purpose and
prohibiting the public from demonstrating there. Id. at 47-48. For further discussion
of the facts and rationale of the Adderley case, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text
supra.
66. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Pell, the Court held that
a state regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews between prisoners and journal-
ists does not deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 838. The Court emphasized that
[t]he 'normal activity' to which a prison is committed-the involuntary
confinement and isolation of large numbers of people, some of whom have
demonstrated a capacity for violence-necessarily requires that considera-
ble attention be devoted to the maintenance of security. Although they
would not permit prison officials to prohibit all expression or communica-
tion by prison inmates, security considerations are sufficiently paramount in
the administration of the prison to justify the imposition of some restrictions
on the entry of outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with
inmates.
Id. at 826-27. See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
InJones, the Court upheld prison regulations forbidding union solicitation as not
violative of the prisoners' first amendment rights of free speech and association. Id. at
130. The Court reasoned that since the solicitation of concerted group activity would
pose problems in the operation of the prison, the total ban on inmate solicitation is
"reasonable, and . . . consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners and with the
legitimate operational considerations of the institution." Id. at 129-30. The Court
further concluded that "[t]he District Court erroneously treated this case as if the
prison environment were essentially a 'public forum.' . . . A prison may be no more
easily converted into a public forum than a military base. Thus [the state] need only
demonstrate a rational basis for [its] distinctions between organizational groups." Id.
at 133-34 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In Lehman,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city policy-of permitting paid commercial
advertising, but not paid political advertising, on the rapid transit vehicles of the
municipal transit system. Id. at 304. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion relied on
the character of the place to which access was sought, categorizing it as part of a
commercial venture by the municipality rather than a public forum. Id. at 301-03
(plurality opinion). The plurality noted that
[h]ere, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other
public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce. . . . The
car card space, although incidental to the provision of public transporta-
tion, is a part of the commercial venture. . . . [A] city transit system has
discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of
advertising that may be displayed in its vehicles.
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school mail facilities, 69 and state college residence halls. 70
Id. at 303 (plurality opinion). The plurality further recognized that since "[njo First
Amendment forum is here to be found," the city need only advance a reasonable
basis for its policy. Id. at 304 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that the state
interests in maximizing revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising, pro-
tecting captive users from the intrusion of political propaganda, avoiding the appear-
ance of favoritism, and administrative problems, were sufficiently reasonable to
sustain the regulation's constitutionality. Id. Cf Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392
F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal is a public forum since
it "so resembles a public thoroughfare to make it an appropriate place for the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights" and the "character of the place, the pattern of usual
activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the population who take advantage of
the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place for communication of
views on issues of political and social significance." Id. at 88-89. The Court con-
cluded that while a plenary prohibition on the distribution of literature in the termi-
nal would be an unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights, reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions consistent with the function of the terminal and
advancing significant governmental interests would withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. Id. at 91-94. See also Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981). The
Fifth Circuit held that airport terminals owned and administered by government
entities are public forums and, therefore, while total bans on literature distribution
and fund solicitation are invalid abridgements of free speech, reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on the exercise of free speech would be tolerated. Id. at 626.
For other cases classifying airports as public forums for the exercise of first
amendment rights, see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Eaves,
601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Rochford, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130
(9th Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at
128-29. The Court held that a letterbox, although it is an authorized depository for
mail and therefore an essential part of the nationwide system for the delivery and
receipt of mail, "does not at the same time undergo a transformation into a public
forum." Id. at 128. Therefore, the Court concluded that since no public forum is
involved, the "reasonable time, place, and manner" test does not apply. Id. at 132.
For further discussion of the Greenburgh case, see notes 28-30 and accompanying text
supra.
69. See, e.g., Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 103 S. Ct.
948 (1983). In Perry, a rival teachers' union challenged the constitutionality of the
school district's policy which permitted only the union certified as the exclusive col-
lective bargaining representative for the teachers to have access to the school district's
internal mail facility. Id. at 951. The Supreme Court held that the mail facility was
not a public forum since it could be distinguished from those "places which by long
tradition or government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate" and from
"public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activities." Id. at 954-55. The Court explained that prohibiting a rival
union from using the school's mail facility was reasonable because it was consistent
with the school district's legitimate interest in preserving access to the school's mail
facility for the transmission of messages of interest and educational relevance to the
students and official messages. Id; at 956, 958. The Court noted that since the rival
union had access to all public and other school communication facilities, it was pro-
vided with adequate alternative channels of communication with the teachers. Id. at
952, 958. The Court further emphasized that even though civic groups, church orga-
nizations, and the union certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for the
school district's teachers were permitted use of school facilities, "[t]his type of selec-
tive access does not transform government property into a public forum." Id. at 956.
The Court concluded that "[t]hese distinctions may be impermissible in a public
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Against this background, the Third Circuit in New Jersey Sports consid-
ered whether the Meadowlands Sports Complex 7 1 constituted a public fo-
rum in order to determine whether the request of ISKCON members to
solicit donations and distribute literature was protected by the first amend-
ment. 72 After reviewing the district court's decision, 73 Judge Weis began his
analysis by assuming that the Authority's status as a government instrumen-
tality furnished the necessary state action to support a civil suit for depriva-
tion of first amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.74 Judge Weis also
observed that the Authority's policy did not affect pure speech as it did not
affect the right to enter the complex and speak without solicitation or distri-
bution, 75 nor did it treat ISKCON members differently from other groups
forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum
to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property." d. at 957.
70. See, e.g., American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d 252 (3d
Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state university regula-
tion which totally prohibited sales demonstrations and solicitations in university-
owned and operated residence halls did not violate the first or fourteenth amend-
ments. Id. at 253. The court noted that while the state university-owned residence
halls are government property, they do not constitute public forums since their pri-
mary function is to provide "a living environment which is conducive to activities
associated with being a student and succeeding academically," not an environment
for commercial activity. Id. at 255-57. Therefore, since the residence halls are non-
public forums, regulation of the exercise of speech must merely be reasonable and
content-neutral in order to withstand constitutional challenge. Id. The court found
that since the commercial activity would disrupt the proper study atmosphere and
privacy of the students, the total ban on commercial solicitation in the dormitories
was reasonable. Id. at 257.
71. 691 F.2d at 159. The Third Circuit, in New jersey Sports, emphasized that its
decision was limited to determining the constitutional status of the race track, sta-
dium, and parking area and did not apply to other facilities under construction at the
time this action was commenced. Id. at 159 n.l.
72. Id. at 158-59. ISKCON argued that the Meadowlands was a public forum
for the distribution of literature in exchange for donations, because speech-related
conduct was compatible with the normal activities of the sports complex. Id. at 159.
Hence, ISKCON argued that a total ban of solicitation and distribution violated the
first amendment since speech in a public forum may only be subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations. See id. For a discussion of state authority to
regulate speech in a public forum, see notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
73. 691 F.2d at 158-59. For a discussion of the district court's decision, see notes
8-11 and accompanying text supra.
74. 691 F.2d at 159. For a discussion of the Authority's status as an institution
of the New Jersey state government, see note I and accompanying text supra. Judge
Weis noted that the district court had dismissed ISKCON's claims against the New
York Football Giants, Inc. and the Cosmos Soccer Club, Inc., and hence, he did not
address the issue of state action with regard to these two private defendants. 691
F.2d at 159, 163.
75. See 691 F.2d at 159, 162. The court noted that the Authority's policy did
not infringe upon the ability of ISKCON members to enter the race track or stadium
or their freedom to "speak with anyone they choose and upon any topic, whether it
be religion, politics, the merits of the Giants' and Cosmos' opponents, or a 'hot tip in
the fifth race.' [Likewise] [t]hey are free to wave penants or wear clothes that demon-
strate a point of view." Id. at 159. Since the Authority's policy neither precluded nor
17
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wishing to solicit donations and distribute literature. 76 Judge Weis then
noted that the extent to which the Authority could limit ISKCON members'
first amendment rights depended upon whether the locale where the speech
or speech-related conduct was prohibited constituted a public or nonpublic
forum.77
Turning to this inquiry, the court in New Jersey Sports recognized that
"[a]lthough 'the analytical line' between public and nonpublic forums 'may
blur on the edges,' " the primary factor in determining the public or non-
public status of the forum is how the locale is used. 78 The Third Circuit
declared that public forum status would be inappropriate where "the full
exercise of First Amendment rights would be inconsistent with 'the special
impinged upon any of these activities, the court held that the policy "does not in any
wa' touch upon the content of pure or symbolic speech." Id.
76. Id. The court noted that the prohibition against literature distribution and
fund solicitation applied to all religious, charitable, political, and civic groups. Id.
The only exception to this policy was in its application to the race track and stadium
concessionaires who are licensed to sell food, beverages, souvenirs, programs, and rac-
ing forms to the spectators. Id. at 158. The concessionaires provide a necessary serv-
ice to both the Authority and the patrons of the Complex by accommodating the
patrons' needs and enhancing their enjoyment of the facility and providing revenues
to the Authority. Id. at 162. As such, the concessionaires are an inherent part of the
complex and their presence is consistent with the Authority's no solicitation policy.
Id. The court, in Newjersey Sports, reasoned that "[o]ther than that exception, the
Authority's policy is uniform and nondiscriminatory. All requests for permission to
solicit funds or distribute literature have been refused. There are no booths or other
structures available for use by outside groups." Id. at 158.
77. Id. at 160. The court declared that the characterization of a forum as public
or nonpublic is critical since first amendment activity in a public forum can be re-
stricted only by reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that serve a significant
governmental interest and leave open alternative channels for communication while
total bans on the exercise of first amendment rights on nonpublic forums are consti-
tutional if they are merely reasonable and content neutral. Id. (citing United States
Postal Serv. v. Greenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 132 and Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980)). For further discussion of the
public and nonpublic forum tests, see notes 21-40 and accompanying text supra.
78. 691 F.2d at 159-60 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburg Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 132). The court explained that "[n]ot all public places are public
forums. The Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that a place owned or con-
trolled by the government does not become a public forum simply because members
of the public are freely permitted to visit it." Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co, v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538-40 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 837;
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. at 48). For a futher discussion of this analytical pos-
ture, see notes 20-30 and accompanying text supra.
The court in New Jersey Sports then listed streets, parks, sidewalks, municipal
theaters, and auditoriums as public forums since they have traditionally served as
forums for free expression. 691 F.2d at 160. State fairs, public schools, and public
libraries were recognized to have been designated limited public forums. Id. The
court reasoned that although those areas are associated with the exchange of ideas,
their availability as public forums is necessarily limited: a state fair provides a tem-
porary means of exhibition to a crowd, and schools and libraries must maintain order
and discipline in order to provide a suitable atmosphere for education and enlighten-
ment. d.
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interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property.' ,,79 Although
the complex was owned and controlled by a governmental agency, 80 the
court held that it was not a public forum for the exercise of first amendment
rights because its character did not fit any of the accepted descriptions of a
traditional public forum, 8 ' and because it was intended to function solely as
a commercial venture.
82
After the threshold determination that the complex was not a public
forum, the court in New Jersey Sports evaluated the Authority's policy under
the more deferential standard of reasonableness. 83 Specifically, the court
sought to ascertain whether the restriction imposed upon first amendment
rights was reasonable and content-neutral in order to determine if the ban
on solicitation was constitutional. 8 4 The court then analyzed the reasonable-
ness of the policy in terms of "whether the proposed activity is basically in-
79. 691 F.2d at 160 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)). The court then listed prisons, military bases, jail grounds,
residence halls, city transit systems, and letterboxes as examples of places that are not
public forums because the exercise of specific speech or speech-related conduct in
each of those places would conflict with legitimate government interests in preserving
such decorum as the facility's central purpose requires. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 158. For information about the government status of the Authority,
see note 1 and accompanying text supra.
81. 691 F.2d at 161. The court explained that
[t]he race track and the stadium are not traditional sites like streets and
parks which are stamped with 'a kind of First Amendment easement.' ...
Nor does the complex resemble theatres and auditoriums which are 'created
for the primary purpose of public communication .. .and . ..as a place
for the exchange of views.'
Id. (citing Kalven, supra note 21, at 13; L. TRIBE, supra note 48, at 689-90).
82. 691 F.2d at 161. The court explained that the complex had not been con-
structed in order to provide a forum for expression:
Instead, the Meadowlands is a commercial venture by the State. It is
designed to bring economic benefit to northern New Jersey, and is expected
to generate at least enough revenue to meet its current expenses and debt
service. It earns money by attracting and entertaining spectators with ath-
letic events and horse races. The complex is not intended to be a public
forum, and it is not unreasonable for the Authority to prohibit outside
groups from engaging in activities which are counterproductive to its
objectives.
Id.
The court noted, however, that even if the Meadowlands did not function as a
commercial venture, the sports complex would not qualify as a public forum because
"race tracks and stadiums are... 'so clearly dedicated to recreational use that talk
of their use as a public forum would in general be totally unpersuasive.'. . . Thus, we
do not have before us the issue which might arise were the stadium used by the
government for civic meetings." Id. at 161 n.3 (quoting Kalven,supra note 21, at 12).
83. 691 F.2d at 161-62. For further discussion of the court's analysis of the rea-
sonableness of this policy, see notes 85-90 and accompanying text 1nfra.
84. 691 F.2d at 160. For futher discussion of the test for regulation of speech in
a nonpublic forum, see text accompanying note 27 supra. Judge Weis had previously
disposed of the content-neutrality requirement at the outset when he stated that the
Authority's policy did not treat ISKCON solicitation and literature distribution any
differently than similar activity by other religious, political, charitable, and civic
groups. 691 F.2d at 159.
1982-83]
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compatible with the normal character and function of the place."'8 5 The
court found that ISKCON's solicitation and distribution efforts would im-
pair the Authority's ability to raise revenue, 86 intrude upon the patrons' en-
joyment of the facility, 7 and impede free movement and crowd control.,,
Therefore, a total ban on literature distribution and fund solicitation was a
reasonable method of alleviating the adverse effects of these activities upon
the operation of the Meadowlands Sports Complex.8 9 Because it found the
method was reasonable and content-neutral, the Third Circuit held that the
policy was consistent with freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first
amendment90
85. 691 F.2d at 161 (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 650-51; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 115-16).
For a discussion of this incompatibility factor, see notes 32 & 37 and accompanying
text supra. The court explained the incompatibility concept using the following
examples:
[Slince two parades cannot march on the same street at the same time, a
governing body may allow only one. . . . It can prohibit them altogether
in the tunnels on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. A city may also ban sound
trucks from broadcasting loud and raucous noises on the streets. . . . [A]
mass demonstration in the middle of Times Square during rush hour may
be prohibited. . . . But students may wear arm bands in passive opposition
to a war as long as they do not disrupt the high school classroom ....
Similarly, civil rights protestors may keep a silent vigil in a segregated li-
brary, although they may not deliver a speech in the reading room.
691 F.2d at 161 (citations omitted). For a discussion of Grayned, see notes 34-37 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Heffion, see notes 38-40 and accompany-
ing text supra.
86. 691 F.2d at 162. The court noted that ISKCON's solicitation of funds from
the race track and stadium patrons would reduce the Authority's income to the ex-
tent that the solicitation would divert funds that might otherwise be spent by patrons
at the concession stands and betting windows. Id. Since the complex receives a per-
centage of the concession stand receipts and the vast majority of its revenues are
derived from the race track proceeds, such diversion of the patrons' money would be
critical to the financial well-being of the complex. Id. For information regarding the
dependency of the complex on the race track proceeds, see note 2 supra.
87. 691 F.2d at 162. The court suggested that when patrons come to the com-
plex for horse racing and athletic events, "[b]eing importuned for donations is not
what a patron bargained for, and it does not tend to make his visit to the sport
complex more pleasurable." Id. The court pointed out that at the race track, where
there is only a short interval between races to ascertain the odds and reach a betting
window, such interception of patrons for solicitation of funds would interfere with
betting, compounding the intrusion upon and annoyance of the patrons. Id. The
court also noted the possibility that some patrons may become so annoyed at the
solicitation efforts that they may prefer to attend private race tracks where they are
not solicited for donations. Id.
88. Id. The Authority has a substantial interest in maintaining traffic and
crowd control at the complex. Id. "It is essential that people move rapidly and with
a minimum of interruptions as they stream through the parking lot and stadium.
Stopping patrons to solicit contributions, accept money, make change, and distribute
literature would impede that necessary free movement." Id.
89. Id. For a discussion of the adverse effects of solicitation and literature distri-
bution at the complex, see notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
90. 691 F.2d at 162. After concluding that the Meadowlands complex race
track and stadium were nonpublic forums, the court stated that it need not decide
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The Third Circuit summarily denied ISKCON's petition for rehear-
ing.'' Judge Adams dissented to this denial, joined by Judges Sloviter and
Becker.92 Judge Adams stated that while he did not disagree with the result
in the case, he was concerned that the court's analysis "sweeps too
broadly."'93 He criticized the majority's reliance upon whether the area tra-
ditionally had been classified as a public forum, since such an analysis "fails
to come to grips with the fact that legal concepts need to evolve to reflect
underlying social realities."'94 Furthermore, Judge Adams stated that the
court should be more hesitant to declare that the exercise of the first amend-
ment right of free speech is incompatible with the nature of the forum.9 5
Finally, Judge Adams suggested that even where solicitation by outsiders
was found incompatible with stadium purposes, there might be alternative
areas outside the stadium, but within the complex, where "the distribution
of ideas" might be appropriate. 96
It is submitted that the Third Circuit correctly concluded that the
Meadowlands Sports Complex race track, stadium, and surrounding parking
area should not be accorded public forum status for literature distribution
and fund solicitation by outside organizations, because the government in-
terests in prohibiting such activities at this complex outweighed the interests
of those persons asserting first amendment rights at this location. 97 It is sug-
gested, however, that in reaching its conclusion, the court improperly placed
too much emphasis upon whether the complex resembled traditional types
of public forums.98 The Third Circuit mimicked the Supreme Court's
whether the Authority's policy qualified as a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction. Id.
91. Id. at 163.
92. Id. (Adams, J., statement sur denial of petition for rehearing). Although
Judges Gibbons and Higginbotham did not join Judge Adam's dissent, they also
would have granted the rehearing en banc. Id.
93. Id. Judge Adams maintained that "[in an area as vital to political and
personal freedoms as the First Amendment, the judiciary should tailor its statements
restricting access as narrowly as possible in order to avoid placing unnecessary limits
on speech." Id.
94. Id. Judge Adams explained that it is necessary to treat the public forum as
an evolving concept because "[c]hanges in patterns of social organization and inter-
action have drastically altered the nature of places offering meaningful opportunities
to speak." Id.
95. Id. Judge Adams continued, "I am reluctant to equate inconvenience or
minor financial burdens with inconsistency." Id.
96. Id. Judge Adams felt that the court should not have decided that solicita-
tion and distribution of literature were inappropriate in all areas of the complex
without explicit findings. Id. See note 93 supra.
97. For a discussion of the government interests in prohibiting outside organiza-
tion literature distribution and fund solicitation at the complex, see notes 86-88 and
accompanying text supra.
98. See 691 F.2d at 161. That the court's decision was based upon the complex's
dissimilarity to traditional public forums is illustrated by the following passage:
The Meadowlands complex does not fit any of the accepted descrip-
tions of a public forum. The race track and the stadium are not traditional
sites like streets and parks which are stamped with 'a kind of First Amend-
1982-831
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penchant for characterizing a forum on the basis of its resemblance to the
public forum paradigms of streets, parks, and sidewalks.99 However, this
dependence on archaic notions of historic forums merely perpetuates and
aggravates the existing "blurry line" public forum analysis promulgated by
the Supreme Court.'0 0
Furthermore, the court's characterization of the complex as a "commer-
cial venture" should not preclude it from attaining public forum status.' 0 '
The Third Circuit appears to rely on Lehman v. Cty of Shaker Heights 10 2 for a
commercial venture exception to the public forum doctrine.' 0 3 One com-
mentator has suggested that in order to support the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in Lehman that transit vehicles are not public forums, the Court virtually
"read government enterprises out of the coverage of the first amend-
ment."' 10 4 The paucity of authority for applying the commercial venture
exception in the public forum context is exemplified by the fact that a thea-
ter, 10 5 a state fair, 10 6 the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal, 10 7 the
ment easement.' . . . Nor does the complex resemble theaters and auditori-
ums which are 'created for the primary purpose of public communication
. ..and . .. as a place for the exchange of views.
Id. (citations omitted).
In his dissent to the denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Adams criticized the
court's reliance on traditional characterizations of public forums. See id. at 163 (Ad-
ams, J., statement sur denial of the petition for rehearing). For Judge Adams' analy-
sis of the Third Circuit's holding, see notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
99. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at
130-31. The Greenburgh Court stated that
[t]his Court has not hesitated in the past to hold invalid laws which. . . too
broadly inhibited the access of persons to traditional First Amendment fo-
rums such as public streets and parks. . . .But it is a giant leap from the
traditional "soapbox" to the letterbox . . . and we do not believe the First
Amendment requires us to make that leap.
Id.
100. Id. at 132. The Greenburgh Court explained that "[w]hile the analytical line
.. .whether a particular piece of. . .property owned or controlled by the govern-
ment is in fact a 'public forum' may blur at the edges, we think the line is nonetheless
a workable one." Id.
101. 691 F.2d at 161 ("Instead [of being a public forum], the Meadowlands is a
commercial venture by the state.").
102. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). For futher discussion of the facts and rationale of the
Lehman case, see note 67 and accompanying text supra.
103. 691 F.2d at 160. The Third Circuit in New Jersey Sports mentioned that in
Lehman, "[p]ublic forum status was denied because the city was engaged in commerce
and the card space was a part of the business venture." Id.
104. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 252 (1976).
105. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). For a
discussion of the Southeastern case, see note 50 and accompanying text supra.
106. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krisha Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
at 640. For a discussion of the He on case, see notes 38-40 and accompanying text
supra.
107. See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968). For a discussion of the Wohn case, see note 67 supra.
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Kennedy Center, 108 and public airports' 0 9 are all commercial ventures that
nevertheless have been accorded public forum status.'1
It is submitted that the public forum doctrine cannot remain a viable
method for determining the permissible scope of the exercise of first amend-
ment rights when its analysis is dependent upon whether the particular lo-
cale is a commercial venture or whether it is " 'stamped with' a kind of First
Amendment easement," '  an anachronistic concept. The public forum
doctrine inherently mandates a case-by-case, forum-by-forum analytical ap-
proach, thus precluding the adoption of a mechanical standard."12 It is sug-
gested, however, that the court must articulate a more uniform test, possibly
emphasizing the governmental interest' 13 and compatibility factors."1
4
Both of these factors require a balancing analysis such that public forum
status should be denied if "the [governmental] interests inhering in the uses
to which the public property is normally put" 1 5 outweigh the interests of
those claiming access to the complex for the exercise of first amendment
rights.' 16 In Greer v. Spock ,117 Justice Powell correctly recognized that the
public forum "inquiry must be more carefully addressed to the intrusion on
the specific activity involved and the degree of infringement on the First
Amendment rights of private parties."' 18
It is submitted that, in NewJersey Sports, the Authority's interests in pro-
108. United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1978). For a dis-
cussion of the Boesewetter case, see note 50 supra.
109. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of
the Fernandes case and other airport cases, see note 67 supra.
110. The Third Circuit, in New Jersey Sports, stated that even if the complex were
not a commercial venture, it would not qualify as a public forum since it is clearly
dedicated to recreational use. 691 F.2d at 161 n.3. To support this recreational use
exception, the court invoked Professor Kalven's statement that swimming pools are
inappropriate for public forum status since they are recreational facilities. d. (citing
Kalven, supra note 21, at 12). It is submitted that to equate a swimming pool to a
race track or stadium extends this recreational use analogy beyond its logical bounds.
111. 691 F.2d at 161 (citing Kalven, supra note 21, at 13).
112. See id. at 160 n.2. The Third Circuit, in New Jersey Sports, advocated a
"sliding scale" analysis which, it is suggested, is merely a seductive euphemism for the
Greenburgh "blurry line" analysis. Id. See also United States Postal Serv. v. Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 132.
113. For an analysis of the government interests factor in the public forum doc-
trine, see notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
114. For an analysis of the compatibility factor in the public forum doctrine, see
notes 32 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
115. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. at 54. For futher discussion of Adderley, see
notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
116. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("Nor could one, con-
trary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square
at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (interests of tranquility justified forbidding use of loudspeakers in resi-
dential neighborhoods).
117. 424 U.S. 838 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). For further discussion of
Greer, see notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
118. 424 U.S. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tecting revenues, 1 9 guarding against possible annoyance to its patrons, 121
and its interest in maintaining orderly crowd control 12 1 create "[s]ome basic
incompatibility . ..between the communication and the primary activity
of an area."' 122 This incompatibility should be sufficient to tip the balance
in favor of the Authority and to outweigh the interests of those who seek to
exercise their right of free speech by distributing literature and soliciting
funds at this complex.'
23
The imminent and eminent danger in the Third Circuit's failure to ar-
ticulate a precise and contemporary standard for categorizing a particular
locale as a public forum is that as society changes in ways which we cannot
foresee, it will be increasingly difficult to analogize back to the society of the
Framers and their traditional forums.' 24 Because it will be difficult to analo-
gize, it will be difficult to determine with any degree of certainty, consis-
tency, and fairness whether a particular locale is a public forum for the
exercise of first amendment rights. Consequently, the absence of an ade-
quate public forum test will increase the risk that the court might sanction
an unconstitutional deprivation of first amendment rights in other forums
which resemble the Meadowlands Sports Complex, in which there exist simi-
lar interests in the free and easy passage of many people in a short amount of
time. 125
Nancy H. Paterson
119. For a discussion of the Authority's interest in revenue maximization, see
note 86 and accompanying text supra.
120. For a discussion of possible patron annoyance, see note 87 supra.
121. For a discussion of the Authority's interest in crowd control, see note 88
and accompanying text supra.
122. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. 691 F.2d at 159. The Third Circuit noted that the Authority's no solicita-
tion policy did not impinge on ISKCON's ability to enter the complex, speak to
patrons, "wave penants [sic] or wear clothes that demonstrate a point of view." Id.
124. See id. at 163 (Adams, J., statement sur denial of petition for rehearing).
125. For a discussion of certain public forums in which orderly movement and
crowd control are important considerations, see notes 105-09 and accompanying text
supra.
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